One of the good things about having a single general manager for a long time is that you can assess his past pretty well. Moves take years to develop and sort themselves out; luckily, we've had years to look at Geoff Petrie's work and assess what has worked out and what hasn't.

2007

It was the Kings' first lottery season in eight years. Sacramento was out of the playoff race by the time the deadline hit, and — critically — Petrie did nothing. The 2006 offseason and 2007 trade deadline were the critical moments in which Petrie decided to try to compete with Bibby, Miller, Artest and Abdur-Rahim instead of going for a full rebuild. In retrospect, it put the Kings back years, and the team didn't have a single playoff berth, let alone legit contention, to show for it.

Of course, trading any of those veterans would have been difficult. Artest had more baggage than the cargo hold of a Transatlantic flight. (But Petrie did trade for him in the first place.) Abdur-Rahim appeared to be aging rapidly and struggled with injury. (But Petrie did sign him a year prior.) The team had absolutely no depth behind Bibby or Miller at point guard and center. (But Petrie was responsible for that roster, completely.)

Rebuilding at that point would have been difficult. But rebuilding is always difficult, and in retrospect Petrie should have pulled the plug, though it did not seem obvious at the time. Hard to fault him; hard to exonerate him.

2008

The Bibby trade was an abomination. He clearly had something left, as he helped lead Atlanta to three straight playoff appearances before the wheels fell off. He was good enough to get another big contract after he left Sacramento. Petrie traded Bibby almost a week before the 2008 deadline, during All-Star Weekend, in fact. We'll never know if there were better options available. But there couldn't possibly have been a worse package to take, right? The only benefit of that trade was the cap space. The pick was useless, Williams wasn't anything special (though he's still in the league and still just 28).

2009

So Petrie did the only thing left to do: gut the team and make trades that would bring much-needed cash.

The Kings made five trades at the 2009 deadline:

Gooden was the only decent player the Kings got in the deal, and he was waived after one game as a favor to his agent. (Swell!) Nocioni had the worst contract in the trade — seriously! — and Ruffin and Simmons were totally expendable and without value. In fact, the fifth deal was …

If you're keeping score, the Kings traded Bibby, Salmons and Miller over two trade deadlines, and got zero prospects, first-round picks or usable starters out of it.

2010

Hughes didn't report and was mercifully waived. Dorsey lasted a few weeks before Westphal had him waived due to immaturity. Landry came in as a starter next to Hawes and Thompson — depending on Westphal's mood (/chest bump) — and did pretty well. The next season would be a different story.

Why the Kings — not even close to being contenders for any of 2010's top 25 free agents — weren't involved in similar deals is a source of great consternation. How do you have valuable cap space, trade a young top-10 scorer with great efficiency and get only a back-up power forward in return? Even though Petrie had a win in flipping Landry a year later (see below), that doesn't excuse a truly abysmal performance at the 2010 deadline. It makes the 2008 and 2009 deals look like Richmond for Webber. (OK, not quite.)

2011

***

Well, we think there's hope yet. We hope there's hope yet. It should be an interesting week as the Kings are in position to use cap space as an asset, something they have failed to do over the past five trade deadlines. Stay tuned.